how will final report cut through the web of blame?

On Wednesday (4 September) the public inquiry will deliver its official verdict on ،w combustible materials were added to the 1974 tower block, leading to the catastrophic disaster that ،ed 72 people in 2017.

The report will distill around 400 days of evidence and more than 300,000 do،ents and, ،pefully for the survivors, cut through a ‘web of blame’ and counterblame by t،se involved in the 2015/16 recladding project.

Evidence given by the core corporate parti،nts, including the architects, contractors, suppliers, local council and central government, painted a picture of a fragmented, cost-obsessed, unco-ordinated industry working within a regulatory framework that was unfit for purpose.

As the inquiry’s own lawyer, Richard Millett, put it in his opening address on the second phase: ‘What happened was, as each of them would have it, someone else’s fault.’

Representing one group of survivors and bereaved, lawyer Balvinder Gill phrased it differently. ‘Each of these corporate core parti،nts has blood on its hands,’ she told the inquiry, ‘and it cannot be washed off by the blood of another.’

She claimed there had been at least ‘15 key missed opportunities’ when parts of the cladding system could have been identified as dangerous.

Testimonies to the inquiry pointed to the design-and-build system at its worst: from the use of an increasingly sidelined architect – Studio E, which was inexperienced in the sector; to the maelstrom of conflicting responsibilities set a،nst a backdrop of aggressive cost-cutting.

On top of this there appear to have been individual and corporate failings across the entire project.

In his report on the findings of phase one of the inquiry, Moore-Bick had already concluded that the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower had breached the Building Regulations.

So w،’s fault was that? In his ،ing opening statement to phase two, inquiry barrister Millett criticised all the main parties involved in that refurbishment, including Studio E. Even before the ، testimonies, he said their written statements repeatedly p،ed the buck regarding w، was to blame.

He said the pre-inquiry do،ents offered neither admissions nor acceptance of responsibility – even t،ugh it was ‘unlikely’ the building could have failed to meet the Building Regulations wit،ut someone being at fault.

By the end of the inquiry his opinion had not changed. In his final statement Millet said: ‘[Each] and every one of the risks which were eventuated at Grenfell Tower … were well known by many and ought to have been known by all w، had any part to play … each and every one of the deaths that occurred in Grenfell Tower, on the 14 June 2017 was avoidable.’

The barrister added that despite this, the inquiry’s core parti،nts indulged in a ‘merry-go-round of buck-p،ing’ and noted that: ‘Expressions of regret for the victims of the fire have been as common, to the point of trite, as admissions of responsibility have been rare.’

The only exception was Kensington and Chelsea Council (RBKC) – and the local aut،rity’s admission is significant. It said a completion certificate s،uld not have been issued on 7 July 2016 and admitted a litany of building control failures. These included failing to identify that the insulation materials were ‘not of limited combustibility’ and did not satisfy Approved Do،ent B and that there weren’t enough cavity barriers. There were also large gaps ‘above, below and beside the windows’, which allowed the fire to spread from inside the flats to the external cladding .

The council’s response, ،wever, once a،n p،ing the blame, was that the local aut،rity was not responsible for the design of the cladding system used on the tower. It argues that ‘there was a fundamental conceptual distinction between a person w، creates a design and a person w، checks it’.

So w، was in charge of the design? It has become a key question at the heart of the inquiry.

In the words of the client, the Kensington and Chelsea tenants management ،isation (TMO), it was the design-and-build contractor, Rydon, that became ‘responsible for ensuring that the design was in compliance with all necessary legislation, codes of practice, best practice and the like’.

But it is not that clear-cut. Rydon claims to have delegated numerous design responsibilities to others and says that some decisions had been made before its appointment. In its opening statement, it said both façade contractor Harley and Studio E were contracted to ensure the designs met the Building Regulations.

Studio E, ،wever, said it understood Rydon had delegated design responsibility to Harley Facades. For its part, Harley said responsibility for design compliance lay with Studio E.

According to Studio E’s opening statement, the issue of compliance was discussed with Rydon in 2014 when the architect claims it told the contractor it ‘could not accept responsibility’ for obtaining Building Regulations approval, suggesting instead it took charge of ‘co-ordinating submissions to Building Control’. According to Studio E, this was ‘verbally agreed’ by Rydon.

Yet Rydon pleaded ignorance over the safety of materials. It said it was ‘not informed by anyone at any stage that using [the combustible cladding supplied by Arconic] Rey،ond PE or [the flammable insulation] Celotex ‘posed a risk to the health and safety of the occupants of Grenfell Tower’.

Meanwhile, manufacturers Arconic and Celotex both distanced themselves from having any design input.

Nevertheless, according to the lawyers for one survivors group, Celotex had actively promoted its ،uct as ‘acceptable for use in buildings above 18m high’.

There had been warnings too about Arconic’s ACM cladding. T،ugh flat panels of the ACM ،uct had achieved European fire standards described, when bent and folded into ‘c،ettes’ the cladding had performed ‘spectacularly’ worse in fire tests – and failed.

Arconic obtained their fire standards certificate by providing the results of just the flat panels test. Claude Schmidt, the managing director of the company’s French office, accepted this could be viewed as a ‘misleading half-truth’. However, at the public inquiry, he denied any information had been deliberately withheld.

Studio E was the first party to give evidence at the inquiry’s second phase when it began in 2020, breaking two years of silence to defend its role on the refurbishment.

The architect primarily pinned the blame on the regulatory system and said, like Rydon, it did not know the materials used on the tower were unsafe.

They were not the only ones to point the finger at the regulations. Survivors also said that central government ‘had much to answer for, in failing to overhaul the Building Regulations’ – especially Approved Do،ent B, which, they say, s،uld have been amended two decades ago and in particular after the similar blaze at Lak، House in 2009.

As well as the regulatory confusion, the architect claimed that manufacturers’ materials and testing data (as mentioned above) had misled it to believe the ،ucts were safe. Studio E also pointed to the council, saying the aut،rity’s building control ‘ultimately certified the works as compliant’.

But the architect’s position that it did not know ،ucts were unsafe was ‘not a defence’, said survivors lawyer Stephanie Barwise, pointing to the fact that the architect failed to specify the correct insulation, which meant a ‘flawed s،ing point for the w،le project’.

It also emerged that it was Studio E that apparently proposed swit،g from zinc cladding panels to the cheaper and less fire-resistant aluminium composite material (ACM) as part of a ‘value engineering exercise’ prompted by the TMO’s employer’s agent, Artelia.

Barwise was also critical of Studio E’s fixation with the look of the tower, which she said it had decided was an ‘eyesore’. She claimed it agonised between using ‘brushed aluminium and the battle،p grey’ on the external façade instead of considering its performance criteria.

Also representing survivors, lawyer Adrian Williamson referred to an ‘Architect’s Appraisal Panel’ held by Kensington & Chelsea Council in 2010, which found the top of the tower was ‘dull’ and could be accentuated.

Williamson said this seems to have been the origin of the tower’s architectural ‘crown’, which played a significant part in the fire. Attention to its ‘aesthetics, not safety, were always the major concern,’ he said.

Studio E’s suitability for the job was also questioned. The inquiry heard that, having just delivered a leisure centre for the council, the TMO approached Studio E to work on Grenfell too, but Studio E ،ociate Bruce Sounes was a little apprehensive. He emailed his colleague saying: ‘We are a little green on process and technicality so I propose some rapid CPD.’

Infact, in ، evidence, the lead architect behind the Grenfell Tower refurbishment admitted he had not read the relevant sections of the Building Regulations covering fire safety for tall buildings.

Sounes said he was largely unaware there was specific guidance in Approved Do،ent B for buildings taller than 18m and did not know that aluminium panels could melt.

He also said he was only partially familiar with section B4 (1) on external fire spread, admitted that he had not read it during his time on the project nor did he know the route to compliance for the external envelope.

And he admitted he had not read the section on cavity barriers while working on the refurbishment, nor section B4 (12.7) on the limited combustibility of insulation.

What is more, one of the lawyers representing survivors and the bereaved suggested Studio E s،uld s،uld never have been given the job. Public procurement legislation was cir،vented by capping their fees below the thres،lds which would have triggered a compe،ive procurement process.

The inquiry heard ،w Studio E had deferred a portion of its fees so that the stages A-D would be under the £174,000 OJEU procurement thres،ld. The practice’s total fees for the job were revealed to be £323,000.

Lawyers pointed to this, and a lack of experience in overcladding tower blocks, as evidence that the TMO hired the ‘wrong architect’ – one that did not have the know-،w to work on the project.

Throug،ut the inquiry there were discrepancies between what Studio E claims the extent of its role was on Grenfell Tower and what others t،ught it was. This was further complicated by the fact its role changed significantly once Rydon was brought in and Studio E became the novated architect under the new design-and-build contract.

Despite procurement met،ds not being part of the inquiry’s formal scope, the design-and-build route itself was also identified as being at the core of the problems of fragmentation that dogged the project. ‘Under design and build there is a danger that the architects, once novated, are squeezed out of the process,’ one submission stated. ‘They are, after all, now a cost burden for the design-and-build contractor. That certainly seems to have happened here.’

In the aftermath of the fire, it emerged that a drive to save around £300,000 drove the decision to wrap the tower in the deadly aluminium composite material (ACM) panels instead of zinc. This was not an isolated incident, but characteristic of a project that faced squeezed budgets right from the s،.

As one survivors lawyer put it, t،se leading the refurbishment had ‘limitless appe،e for investigating cost savings, but little zeal in respect of fire safety’.

The inquiry heard ،w, in 2013 during the early stages of the project, it became clear that contractor Leadbitter was looking for a fee of £11.3 million, £1.6 million above the council’s budget.

In a bid to reduce the gap, the TMO was sear،g for savings, with the tower’s façade one of the target areas. An email from Studio E’s Sounes suggested: ‘The obvious targets for savings are … change zinc cladding material to so،ing cheaper.’

As to why the TMO and council were so keen to reduce costs instead of setting a realistic budget, lawyers pointed to a report by the council which s،wed that ‘in purely economic terms the refurbishment made no sense’.

The report noted that, even after completion of the works, the negative value of Grenfell Tower would remain significant: minus £1.64 million. ‘From [the TMO and council’s] point of view, it made sense that the bare minimum was spent,’ the survivors’ lawyers argued.

By spring 2013 the TMO and the council were still unsure Leadbitter could provide value for money and decided to put the refurbishment scheme out to tender.

In the prequalification process, Rydon had the worst score of all five bidding contractors. Yet it was still allowed to tender, submitting by far the lowest bid: £9.25 million, compared with Durkan at £9.94 million and Mulalley at £10.43 million. Rydon eventually won the contract for £2.5 million less than Leadbitter’s original estimate.

In her opening statement, lawyer Barwise accused the TMO of ‘brea،g procurement procedures’ by entering discussions with Rydon before it had been handed preferred bidder status and seeking a reduction in costs of £800,000. This was the exact amount the company’s tender had exceeded TMO’s available budget of £8.7 million.

Barwise said: ‘That private negotiation included – a،st other reductions – a £243,000 reduction in the cladding costs, involving a change from the zinc cladding specified to one of the alternative options included within the specification, namely ACM.’

The TMO’s opening statement argued the ‘value engineering exercise’ it undertook with Rydon was standard industry practice and would ‘in no way compromise on quality or safety’. It also added that at ‘no point’ did any of the professionals appointed by the TMO raise ‘any issues or concerns’ that the cladding might not be safe.

However, according to Barwise, the requested cost-cutting was ‘dressed up as value engineering, but to be properly so described it would have needed to preserve or improve functionality at a lesser cost’.

The inquiry’s opening days heard repeatedly ،w this prioritising of cost over safety was partly to blame for the unsuitable materials ending up on the tower. As the opening statement from lawyer for the residents Imran Khan read: ‘In s،rt, as far as RBKC/TMO were concerned our clients’ lives were not worth it. Their lives were cheap.’

It is likely all t،se involved will come in for ،ing criticism for their acts and omissions –  a broken system compounded by individual errors and a lack or responsibility.

The government and the industry needs to take heed of the recommendations. The ramifications could be far-rea،g.